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Ohio Participation in Interstate Compacts
The interstate compact procedure was little used before the
twentieth century. From the year 1789 to 1900, only sixteen com-
pacts were adopted by the states. Since the turn of the century
however, several times as many compacts have been contracted
and the compact procedure is steadily taking on new significance
as a means of interstate cooperation.'
The United States Constitution2 absolutely prohibits the entry
by the states into any treaty, alliance or confederation. The same
section of the constitution conditions the entry by the states into
any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign
power upon the consent of congress.
The distinction between treaties, alliances or confederations
and compacts or agreements is a very fine one and the differences
have never been exactly or concretely defined. Justice Story dis-
tinguished them in the following way:
Perhaps the language of the former clause may be more
plausibly interpreted from the terms used, 'treaty, alliance
or confederation' and upon the ground that the sense of
each is best known by its association (noscitur a sociis) to
apply to treaties of a political character; such as treaties
of alliance for purposes of peace and war; and treaties of
confederation, in which the parties are leagued for mutual
government, political cooperation, and the exercise of po-
litical sovereignty; and treaties of cession of sovereignty, or
conferring internal political jurisdiction, or external politi-
cal dependence, or general commercial privileges. The lat-
ter clause, 'compacts and agreements' might then very
properly apply to such as regarded what might be deemed
mere private rights of soverignty; such as questions of
boundary; interests in land situate in the territory of each
other; and other internal regulations for the mutual com-
fort and convenience of states bordering on each other.
Such compacts have been made since the adoption of the
constitution ...
As stated before, a state must have the consent of congress to
legitimately enter into a compact. This constitutional provision has
been interpreted however, as meaning that the congressional con-
sent may be either express or implied from congressional action
and either prior or subsequent to the adoption of the compact by
the states. In Virginia v. Tennessee,4 the boundary line between
Virginia and Tennessee was ascertained and adjusted by commis-
1 Comment, 34 YAL L. J. 684 (1925).
2 U.S. CoNsT. Art. 1, sec. 10.
3 2 STORY, CommiARms ON TE CoxsTrrurnow, sec. 1403 (5th ed. 1891).
4 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1892).
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sioners appointed in the two states. The boundary thus adjusted
by the commissioners and confirmed by the two states was treated
by congress as the true boundary when congress districted these
states for judicial and revenue purposes. Although congress did
not expressly give its consent to the adoption of this compact by
these two states, the required consent was implied from the con-
gressional action. In Green v. Biddle,5 a promise by a newly formed
state to preserve the title to certain lands within its borders was
upheld on the ground that congress had given its consent to the
states entering into the compact by subsequently admitting the
state into the Union.
There is some authority supporting the proposition that con-
gressional consent is not required at all unless the compact or
agreement is "political" in nature.6 The term must have a different
meaning in this sense than it has in distinguishing compacts and
agreements from treaties, alliances and confederations or the con-
sent requirement would lose all its meaning. The result would
otherwise be that congressional consent is required only when the
agreement is a treaty, alliance or confederation, in which case it
is invalid regardless of congressional consent.
An interstate compact can be terminated in several different
ways. The easiest and most definite method of termination is to
specifically provide for the termination of the compact after the
expiration of a certain length of time from the date of entry. But
a compact may also be terminated by subsequent inconsistent
federal legislation. In Pennsylvania v. WheeZing Bridge Company,7
Virginia and Kentucky had entered into a compact with the con-
sent of congress regarding the free navigation of the Ohio River.
Still, subsequent federal legislation requiring officers and crews
of vessels navigating the Ohio River to regulate their vessels so
as not to interfere with the elevation or construction of bridges at
Wheeling and Bridgeport at their then height and position, was
held to be the legitimate exercise by congress of its constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce. This legislation was not
invalid by reason of the interstate compact entered into with the
consent of congress.
If an interstate compact is terminated by subsequent federal
legislation inconsistent with the terms of the compact on the theory
that the consent of congress is thereby withdrawn and that the
continuing consent of congress is necessary for the existence of a
valid interstate compact, congress could terminate a compact merely
s Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823).
6 Note, 23 IOWA L. Rrv. 618 (1938).
7 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (U.S.
1855).
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by withdrawing its consent. Inconsistent legislation would be un-
necessary. But if congressional consent is only a condition prece-
dent to the existence of a valid interstate compact, congress could
not terminate the compact merely by withdrawing its consent.8 In
Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal Company,9 the supreme court
held that citizens of states which were parties to a compact were
not parties and could not object to the termination of the compact
by the mutual consent of the state parties.
Subsequent inconsistent legislation by one of the state parties
cannot terminate an interstate compact. It was held in Green v.
Biddle,'( that the legislation was invalid on the theory that inter-
state compacts are within the contracts clause of the federal con-
stitution."t
An interstate compact can be enforced or its validity ques-
tioned by the state parties to the compact 2 or by individuals, 3 who
would otherwise be injured. Subject to the usual requirements
for jurisdiction, an action to enforce or question the validity of an
interstate compact may be brought in the state14 or lower federal
courts.' s The action may also be brought in the United States
Supreme Court when the state is a party under the constitutional
provision 16 granting original jurisdiction to the supreme court of
any suit to which a state is a party.
The Ohio Legislature, in 1937, established the Ohio Commis-
sion on Interstate Cooperation. 17 This statute was amended in 1949
and, as amended, the commission consists of the seven members
of the senate committee on interstate cooperation, a similar house
committee and the seven members of the Governor's committee on
interstate cooperation. It is expressly made one of the functions
of this commission" to endeavor to advance cooperation between
Ohio and other units of government whenever it seems advisable
to do so by formulating proposals for and by facilitating the adop-
tion of interstate compacts. Also in 1937, Ohio adopted the Pyma-
tuning Lake compact. 19 This compact was the first to which Ohio
8 Note, 23 IowA L. REv. 618 (1938).
9 The Mayor, Recorder, Alderman and Common Council of Georgetovn v.
The Alexandria Canal Co. and William Turnbull, 12 Pet. 91 (U.S. 1838).
10 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823).
11U.S. CoxsT. Art. 1, sec. 10.
12 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
13 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823).
14 State v. Cunningham, 102 Miss. 237, 59 So. 76 (1912).
IS Aicheson v. Endless Chain Dredge Co., 40 Fed. 253 (E.). Va. 1889).
16 U.S. CoNsT. Art. 3, sec. 2.
17 OHmo GEN. CoDE §§ 1379-1 to 1379-12.
18 OHIo GEa. CODE § 1379-6.
19 117 Ohio Laws 508 (1937-1938).
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was a party. ° It was entered into with Pennsylvania for the pur-
pose of establishing a recreation district with concurrent penal
jurisdiction and also to conserve water. On September 17, 1937,
Ohio entered into another compact. 21 Under the terms of this
compact, the judicial and administrative authorities of a state, a
party to the compact, are to permit a person convicted of an of-
fense within such state and placed on probation or released on
parole to reside in any other state party to this compact under
certain conditions contained in the compact. All the states except
Nevada, North Carolina and Texas adopted this compact. Con-
gressional consent was previously granted on June 6, 1934.
Since 1937, Ohio has adopted two other compacts. One was
entered into with the twenty oil and gas producing states to prevent
the physical waste of oil and natural gas from any cause. 2 This
compact was to expire September 1, 1947, but was extended for
four years to September 1, 1951, by the Governor who was author-
ized in the original bill to extend the expiration date of the com-
pact. The other was the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Com-
pact,2 3 the purpose of which is the control of future pollution in
and the abatement of existing pollution from the rivers, streams
and water in the Ohio River basin which flow through or border
upon any of the states, parties to this compact. Congress author-
ized the adoption of this compact on June 8, 1936. Conditioned
on the adoption by New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, Ohio
entered this compact on August 31, 1939. Ohio, West Virginia,
New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Kentucky and Virginia are the
parties to this compact.
In the case of State v. Sims,24 the Supreme Court of West
Virginia rendered a decision in connection with this compact which
could make it practically impossible to achieve interstate coopera-
tion by use of the compact procedure. This was a mandamus ac-
tion to compel the auditor of West Virginia to honor a requisition
for West Virginia's contribution to the Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Commission which was appropriated by the legislature
of West Virginia. The majority of the court held that legislation
authorizing West Virginia to become a party to this compact was
invalid as violative of the West Virginia Constitution because the
state by entering the compact would delegate to the commission a
substantial part of the state's police power and the compact, if
valid, would create a contract binding on future legislatures.
Judge Given, in a strong dissenting opinion, stated that inter-
3oComment, 73 U.S. L. RPv. 75 (1939).
21 Omo GEN. CODE § 108.
22 120 Ohio Laws 203 (1943-1944).
23 OHIo GL. CODE § 14881.
24 State ex rel. Dyer et al. v. Sims, 58 S.E. 2nd 766 (1950). Certiorari to
U.S. Supreme Court.
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state compacts are an essential and often-used part of our form
of government. He argued that granting to the commission the
power to enforce its orders as to the disposition of sewage against
municipalities, corporations, persons and entities of the member
states was not an unconstitutional delegation of the state police
power because of the following limitation on this power in Article
9 of the Compact: "No such order shall go into effect unless and
until it receives the assent of at least a majority of the commission-
ers from each of not less than a majority of the signatory states;
and no such order upon a municipality, corporation, person or
entity in any state shall go into effect unless and until it receives
the assent of not less than a majority of the commissioners from
such state." The commissioners from each state are representatives
of that state, responsible only to the authority of that state and
are subject to removal as such commissioners by the governor of
that state.
It was also argued by Judge Given that entering the compact
did not "create a debt" or bind future legislatures to make appro-
priations since the last clause of Article 5 of the compact provides:
The commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind
prior to the making of appropriations adequate to meet the
same; nor shall the commission pledge the credit of any of
the signatory States, except by and with the authority of
the legislature thereof.
The majority opinion states that the creation of a state com-
mission which requires an appropriation of public funds to carry
out its purpose is usually not treated as the creation of a "debt"
within the constitutional provision that no debt shall be contracted
by the state except to meet casual deficits and other specified sit-
uations, although the continuation of such commission for an in-
definite period necessarily involves future appropriations. In the
majority opinion however, they held the compact to be entirely
different because it was between sovereign states and the Federal
Government, treating it as a contract which the Supreme Court
of the United States, in a suit between states has power to en-
force. They said it was a contract binding on all the parties thereto,
the obligation of which continues so long as that contract exists.
Although late in initiating its participation in interstate com-
pacts, Ohio may still become a leader in the field due to the estab-
lishment of the Ohio Commission on Interstate Cooperation unless
Ohio follows the decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia
in State v. Sims. This is not likely however, due to the fact that
interstate cooperation is becoming increasingly more important
because of improved methods of transportation and communication
and the greater complexity of our society. The future will probably
see interstate compacts, along with uniform and reciprocal state
legislation, take on greater and greater significance.
John Duffy
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